Government Misclassification Case

1. Frequently Asked Questions on FLSA Litigation Against the U.S.
   1. What is the government's stance on when a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action against the United States is considered "commenced"?
   The government argues that under 29 U.S.C. § 216 and § 256, a collective action under the FLSA against the United States is not legally "commenced" until each plaintiff both files a complaint and submits a separate written consent to become a party plaintiff in that action. They emphasize that these are two distinct requirements under the statute.
   2. What is the plaintiffs' counter-argument regarding the requirement of written consent, especially for named plaintiffs in an FLSA collective action?
   Plaintiffs, such as Mr. Lambro, argue that filing a complaint that expresses an intent to participate in a collective action should be sufficient, particularly for the named plaintiff who initiated the lawsuit. They contend that requiring a separate written consent from the named plaintiff is redundant and that the purpose of the consent requirement in § 216 is to protect unwary individuals from being drawn into lawsuits without their explicit agreement.
   3. How has the court addressed the differing interpretations of the written consent requirement for FLSA collective actions against the U.S.?
   The court, in alignment with the government's interpretation, has held that the plain language of 29 U.S.C. § 256 necessitates both the filing of a complaint and a separate written consent from each party plaintiff for the action to be considered commenced. The court has declined to adopt the plaintiffs' argument that a named plaintiff's signature on the complaint sufficiently indicates consent, stating that it is not the court's role to rewrite the statute based on policy arguments about potential redundancy.
   4. What is "equitable tolling" and what is the central dispute surrounding its availability in FLSA cases against the United States?
   Equitable tolling is a legal doctrine that allows a court to pause or extend the statute of limitations (the deadline for filing a lawsuit) in certain circumstances where a plaintiff was prevented from filing on time due to reasons beyond their control. The primary dispute is whether this doctrine is applicable to FLSA claims brought against the United States, given the principle that waivers of the government's sovereign immunity are to be narrowly construed and that statutes of limitations within such waivers are often considered jurisdictional.
   5. What are the government's key arguments against the application of equitable tolling in FLSA lawsuits against the U.S.?
   The government typically argues against equitable tolling by asserting that the FLSA's statute of limitations, as it applies to the United States, is a condition of the government's waiver of sovereign immunity and is therefore jurisdictional, meaning it cannot be waived or tolled. They often cite the Brockamp factors, which courts consider when determining whether equitable tolling should be implied against the government, emphasizing aspects like the explicitness and emphasis of the statute of limitations, as well as any existing statutory exceptions.
   6. What are the plaintiffs' main arguments in favor of applying equitable tolling to FLSA claims against the United States?
   Plaintiffs argue that equitable tolling should be available in FLSA cases against the United States just as it is against private defendants. They contend that no special or more restrictive standard should apply to the government in this context. Plaintiffs often cite case law suggesting that equitable tolling is generally available in FLSA cases under appropriate circumstances and reference Irwin v. DVA to argue against creating special exceptions for the government regarding tolling. They may also argue that specific circumstances, such as misleading infor

https://www.whitcomblawpc.com/